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VIEWS & REVIEWS

The Far Side of Nothingness
Reading MitchelPs Spirituality and Emptiness
JAMES L. FREDERICKS

A TRADITIONAL TASK for Christian theology has been the need to understand the place of Christianity among the multitude of religions and
the meaning of those religions for Christians. Endeavors of this sort
can ordinarily be found under the classification "theology of religions/' Often these theologies are based on a theory of religion in
general in which specific religions are interpreted from a privileged standpoint within which all religions appear as examples. Today, a small
but growing number of theologians are expressing dissatisfaction with
such top-down approaches to religious pluralism. They point out the
tendency of such theologies to interpret religions either as irreducibly
different (witness Karl Barth's rejection of religion in favor of revelation) or as simply more of the same (as with Karl Rahner's "anonymous Christian"). Instead of an all-encompassing theology of religions, they are engaging in detailed studies of the texts and symbols of
specific religious traditions in the hope of eventually correlating their
findings critically with Christian texts. In place of a theology of religions, these theologians are turning to what may be called a "comparative theology/ '
Comparative theology is still very much in the process of working
out its methods and procedures. What constitutes good comparison?
Emphasizing only differences can easily become an exercise in apologetics while excusing the theologian from his or her constructive responsibilities. Neither is emphasizing only similarities helpful: appreciating
the real differences between religions very often proves to be the occa130
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sion for deepening our own religious understanding. In my view, the
comparative theologian needs to ask how a careful study of another
religion enables and requires us to revise our understanding of the
Christian tradition. This will require not only the recognition of similarities and differences, but the willingness to risk new interpretations of
Christian truths in the light of these findings.
A noteworthy example of a comparative theology is John Keenan's
The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology.1 Keenan uses Mahayana Buddhist metaphysics (especially Madhyamika and Yogacara
thought) in lieu of Platonism to interpret anew the doctrine of the
Christ for Christianity. In effect, he asks how a Mahayana reading of
classical Christian texts allows us to enlarge our understanding of the
truth of Christ. Another example of a comparative theologian at work
is John Cobb's Beyond Dialogue.2 In contrast to Keenan, who is interested in using Buddhist thought as a lens for reading Christian texts
in new ways, Cobb traces similarities and differences in the two
religions as a way of working toward their mutual transformation.
As an example of comparative theology, Donald Mitchell's book,
Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics of Spiritual Life in Buddhism and Christianity,* bears more resemblance to Cobb's approach
than to Keenan's. Unlike either Cobb or Keenan, however, Mitchell
has chosen to focus on spirituality more than systematic theology
(although, as the reader shall see, Mitchell's spirituality is dense with
doctrinal concerns). Since this point is crucial for appreciating the importance of this book, allow me a few words regarding "spirituality"
or "spiritual theology" as an academic enterprise.
The study of spirituality and its relationship to Christian theology is
much debated. Bernard McGinn has recently commented on the near
"total semantic chaos" characteristic of the discussion.4 The roots of
1

John P. Keenan, The Meaning of Christ: A Mahayana Theology (Maryknoll,
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989).
2
John Cobb, Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity
and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
3
Donald Mitchell, Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics of Spiritual Life in
Buddhism and Christianity (New York: Paulist Press, 1991).
4
Bernard McGinn, "The Letter and the Spirit: Spirituality as an Academic Discipline," in Christian Spirituality Bulletin: Journal of the Society for the Study of
Christian Spirituality, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1993), p. 4. McGinn also cites Italian medievalist
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the problem can be traced back at least to the rise of scholastic theology in Europe. In the first several centuries of Christianity's development in Western Europe, theological reflection on doctrine was
inseparable from the monastic practice of asceticism. This began to
change when theology moved from the monastery to the university in
the twelfth century. As for the word "spirituality" itself, in the Christian scriptures, we find the Apostle Paul contrasting sarx (flesh) and
pneuma (spirit), by which he intended not a dualism of the material
and the immaterial, but rather a contrast between a life lived in subservience to egocentric appetites and a life lived in God-given freedom.
Paul also rendered pneuma as an adjective (pneumatikos) in order to
describe what has been transformed by the power of God. Mitchell is
not concerned with the various attempts to define the study of spirituality. Midway through this book's course, however, he does speak of
spirituality as "a mode of spiritual living that enhances one's transformation in God." To study this mode of living is not to exclude
Christian doctrine, but certainly it is to emphasize its existential
import.
Mitchell's turn to spirituality is calculated. A theme common to
many Kyoto School authors is their emphasis on the "existential"
meaning of their claims.5 This is evident in authors such as Nishitani
Keiji, Hisamatsu Shin'ichi and Abe Masao whose concern for the
religious fate of the modern world is explicit. Even though it is less evident infiguressuch as Nishida Kitarö and Tanabe Hajime, to read these
authors without an appreciation of their concern for the concrete dynamics of religious living is to run the risk of a serious misreading. It is
precisely in this forum that Mitchell wishes to engage the Kyoto School
and this is what dictates his turn to Christian spirituality. But, the most
significant contribution of this book is not that Mitchell responds to

Gustavo Vinay's claim that the term "spirituality" is "a necessary pseudoconcept we
don't know how to replace." See "'Spiritualità': Invito a una discussione," in Studia
Medievali 3a serie 2 (1961).
5
Notice, therefore, that the term "spirituality" is more and more being applied to
religions other than Christianity. I find it not at all suprising that a member of the
Kyoto School, Takeuchi Yoshinori, should be the chief editor of the recent volume of
the "world spirituality" series. See Buddhist Spirituality, Takeuchi Yoshinori, ed.
(New York: Crossroad, 1993).
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the Kyoto School from the perspective of Christian spirituality instead
of systematic theology. Rather, it is that Mitchell uses the insights of
the Kyoto School as a means of carrying on his own explorations of the
Christian spiritual life. This means that the book will be a disappointment to some and a breath of fresh air to others. It will disappoint
Christians (and no doubt some Buddhists as well) accustomed to approaching spirituality from the standpoint of psychology. Likewise it
will disappoint a metaphysically-minded readership interested in the
technical problems regarding the relationship between Christian theism
and Nishida's philosophy. For the former, Mitchell's text will be too
much concerned with doctrine. For the latter, its major claims will not
be argued in sufficient detail. Critics from both camps need to be
reminded that Mitchell's interest throughout the book remains Christian spirituality.
In the course of this project, Mitchell treats of a great deal of material from both the Kyoto School and the Christian spiritual tradition.
Thefirsthalf of each of the seven chapters summarizes the thought of a
Kyoto School philosopher. Mitchell's reflections on spirituality follow
as a response. This procedure succeeds well in placing Nishida, Nishitani, Abe, Tanabe, Takeuchi, Hisamatsu and Tokiwa Gishin in conversation withfiguresfrom Christian spirituality such as Teresa of Avila,
John of the Cross, Thomas Merton and especially Chiara Lubich, foundress of a lay-oriented spiritual renewal movement known as Focolare.
Material is organized around the theme of kenosis (self-emptying) in
Christian spirituality. Thefirstchapter deals with the theology of creation as the kenosis of God which lends itself naturally to a discussion
of Nishida's seminal notion of absolute nothingness. Chapter two
deals with the "negative kenosis of humankind" which is the Fall.
Here, Nishitani's protest against secularism serves as the conversation
partner. In the third chapter, Abe's kenotic approach to Christology
sparks a discussion of the Christian doctrine of redemption. The following two chapters, devoted to the theme of sanctification, brings
Tanabe and Takeuchi and their use of Shinran into view. In the sixth
chapter, devoted to renewal movements in Buddhism and Christianity,
we find a comparison of the FAS Society in Kyoto with the Focolare
movement. The final chapter is given over to Mary, the mother of Jesus, as a model of Christian spirituality.
Issues of substantial interest raised by this book are too numerous
133
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even to summarize. I will touch on but a few.
Thefirstchapter of the book offers us a perspective on what Mitchell
takes to be a fundamental difference between the Christian mystical
experience of God and the Buddhist experience of emptiness (as articulated in Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness). In hisfinalessay on
religion, Nishida asserts that God and the self arise mutually out of absolute nothingness, which is at once the formlessness out of which all
forms arise and the absolute "near side" of reality which overcomes
the dualism of transcendence and immanence. But according to Mitchell, this experience of "Void" (Mitchell's word, and not, in my view, a
suitable translation of kü or zettai mu as used by Nishida) is not yet the
fullness of Christian mystical experience. Against Nishida, Mitchell
claims that the living God of Christian faith does not arise correlatively
with the finite self out of absolute nothingness. And against some of
Nishida's interpreters, he argues that the Christian God is not a personification of an infinite principle which is ultimately formless. Absolute nothingness does not appear within consciousness as an object.
Rather, it forms the "place" (basho) within which subjectivity and the
world of objects arise. On this point, Mitchell is in agreement with
Nishida. However, Mitchell does not think of absolute nothingness as
an onto-theological category. It is, rather, a way of experiencing the
world.
Absolute Nothingness is not a 'something' that attracts our attention. Rather, it is a transparent "nothing" that directs our
attention to the forms of life in a new and compassionate
way. [p. 25]
And this qualification leads Mitchell to observe a différence between
Buddhism and Christianity of the deepest dye. Christian mystics also
are familiar with this Void into which the personal God is annihilated
in nothingness. But for Christians, formless nothingness is merely a
passage leading to the revelation of the Living God beyond the Void.
Thus, in the fullness of Christian mystical experience, the Void itself is
given form by the grace of the God who constitutes the "far side" of
the Void's "near side."
Simply put, the particular mystical experience of the Void
into which the personal God seems to disappear is only apar134
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tial experience of that Void. There is another dimension to
the mystical experience that must be added for it to be a/w//
Christian experience. So, I would propose that while the Buddhist experience of Emptiness perceives no far side apart
from the near side, a Christian mystic finds that through
the grace of Christ indwelling within, he or she is given a
"spiritual eye," as it were, to see into the mystery of the
Void. And he or shefindstherein a far-side dimension that is
not absolutely identified with the near side of creation, and is
not formless and impersonal, [pp. 24-25]
This "far side," Mitchell argues, is in fact the Christian Trinity. Initially, the three persons of the Trinity appear out of the Void. In the fullness of Christian mystical experience, the Void is experienced as a field
of experience established by the kenosis of the three persons. In other
words, the Trinity is not a derivative reality emerging as form out of
the formless, but rather the reverse: it is absolute nothingness that
arises kenotically out of the intra-Trinitarian relations.
Those familiar with Nishida's writings will find much to object to
here. Some, no doubt, will want to argue that Mitchell's "Void" is
in fact relative nothingness and not absolute nothingness.6 Mitchell's
notion of God as the "far side" of the formless Void is perhaps infelicitous. However, disciples of Nishida may want to think again.
Mitchell's theological qualification of absolute nothingness has merit
to the extent that it tries to offer a corrective to the monistic tendencies
in Nishida's thought. Absolute nothingness, as articulated by Nishida,
is not a metaphysical monism. Yet as with other examples of Japanese
hongaku thought, it lends itself readily to rhetorical strategies which
privilege the totality and unity of phenomena beyond discriminating
consciousness. Nishida's notion of absolute nothingness is then easily
misinterpreted as a metaphysical monism. Misunderstood in this way,
absolute nothingness is not only unacceptable to Christian theism, it is
bad Buddhism as well. Nishida's thought needs to be developed with
6

Abe Masao, in his "Preface" to Spirituality and Emptiness, notes that Mitchell's
argument on this point "is one of the most provocative and suggestive sections in the
book, and deserves serious consideration by persons seeking to understand the relationship of God to Emptiness" (see p. xi).
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more attention to this issue. Mitchell's insistence on the non-dual
"otherness" of the Christian God might serve as starting point for
reflection.7
Mitchell's position on absolute nothingness also allows him to
highlight what he considers a genuinely interesting difference distinguishing Buddhism and Christianity. Buddhism's emphasis on the absolute near side ¿wising as the emptiness of all beyond discriminating
consciousness leads it to the practice of compassion. In contrast,
Christianity's affirmation of a far side in mystical experience leads it to
the practice of love. This is Mitchell at his most provocative. Is there a
real difference between love (agape) and compassion (karuna)! If there
is, can the two be distinguished phenomenologically? If so, what potential does Buddhist compassion hold for transforming and deepening
the Christian spiritual practice of love? It would be worth hearing more
from Mitchell on this theme.
A second issue of interest has to do with Mitchell's treatment of
Tanabe. A fundamental difference between Nishida and Tanabe is the
latter's emphasis on the religious as a concrete event of grace resulting
in the transformation of awareness. Regarding absolute nothingness,
Tanabe and Nishida are in agreement that the absolute does not form a
metaphysical substratum. Tanabe parts company with his teacher over
Nishida's use of the metaphor "place" (basho) for absolute nothingness. In Tanabe's view, absolute nothingness is not a topos intuitable
by means of non-discriminating consciousness. Rather, it is known
"metanoetically" in the transforming event of religious conversion
through other-power. Thus, instead of Nishida's "place," Tanabe advances his idea of "absolute mediation" (zettai baikai) in which the absolute is present only as relative being.
When Mitchell asks if other-power can be identified with the Christian doctrine of grace, the answer we are given is a surprisingly unequivocal "no." However similar they may appear phenomenologically, the
two are not the same. In this respect Mitchell's position seems to resemble Karl Barth's rejection of Jödoshinshü. Christian grace implies "a
7

Elsewhere I have argued that the Kyoto School's encounter with Christian theism
might fruitfully lead to a reassessment of Tanabe's criticism of Nishida. Tanabe's sense
of the non-dual otherness of absolute nothingness, explored in his turn to Shinran's
doctrine of other-power (tariki)t is not sufficiently appreciated in Japan.
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notion of the absolute that is not 'absolutely' identified with the transformative process of existence" [p. 93]. Therefore, "in Christian sanctification," Mitchell claims, "one is opened up to something more
than the sanctification process itself" [p. 94]. To be sure, Christianity
recognizes that the action of grace requires a mediating role on the part
offinitethings. However, in Christian mysticism, unlike Jödoshinshü,
One is aware of the mediation of the absolute as being a
Trinitarian mediation of God-Love that is an activity of the
Trinity itself. One recognizes the mediating Trinitarian structure to existence, but also sees that this structure reflects something else, something that the Christian calls "Abba,"
Father, [p. 94]
Moreover, to distinguish this "something else" from Tanabe's views
on the mediation of absolute nothingness, Mitchell argues that Abba
is a manifestation. Thus it seems that while metanoia through Buddhist other-power leads to a mediation of the absolute byfinitebeing,
in contrast, metanoia through Christian grace leads to a manifestation
of ultimate reality as Abba.
How does Mitchell's manifestation differ from Tanabe's mediation?
Is it to be construed as an empirical experience unavailable to Buddhists? Seemingly not. Is it to be understood as a supernatural
phenomenon bestowed on Christians but not on Buddhists? Such a
view is very reminiscent of Barth's a priori rejection of Jödoshinshü.
Barth could walk blithely away from the appreciable phenomenological resemblances between Jödoshinshü's other-power and Christian
grace because of his decidedly unmediated understanding of revelation
as the "incommensurate." What does it mean to say that Buddhist
other-power is mediated by finite being but Christian grace implies a
manifestation of Abba? Do Christians enjoy an unmediated (incommensurate) experience of the absolute which simply excludes Buddhists? Tanabe's notion of absolute mediation has much more to teach
Christianity than Mitchell is willing to grant. At the very least it may
suggest a way of understanding the action of grace sacramentally
without presupposing a supernatural world.
A third issue worthy of comment is Mitchell's skillful use of Kyoto
School thought in exploring the relationship between ascetics and mysticism for Christianity. A traditional task for Christian spirituality has
137

JAMES L. FREDERICKS

been to articulate the relationship between religious discipline and the
mystical infusion of grace. This problem parallels the doctrinal problem of the relationship between grace and nature. How is the reality of
grace related to the spiritual quest? As a way of constructing a model
for understanding this issue, Mitchell draws our attention to Zen and
Jödoshinshü andfindsabundant resources for Christian spirituality in
the Kyoto School. Commenting on his own Jödoshinshü tradition,
Takeuchi Yoshinori notes that salvation arises where the noble quest
for enlightenment meets the compassion of Amida. In contrast to the
other-power orientation of Pure Land Buddhism, Zen is often criticized as a self-power path. Ueda Shizuteru, however, argues that Zen
enlightenment does not arise through ego-assertion, but rather through
the death of the ego. Does this not suggest that Zen too is an "otherpower" path? Mitchell notes that while Zen places more attention on
the quest than Jödoshinshü, both see the "shipwreck" of the ego and
the birth of the True Self as a work not of the finite ego.
The preceding discussion places Mitchell in a position to note that
Christianity bears some resemblance with both Jödoshinshü and Zen.
Like Zen, Christianity holds that there are practices which promote the
death of thefiniteego and like Jödoshinshü, Christianity believes that
even this is grace. To establish this more concretely, Mitchell offers an
extended discussion of The Interior Castle of Teresa of Avila as a way
of exploring Takeuchi's claim. Spiritual transformation happens
where asceticism and mysticism meet. Mitchell succeeds in opening up
a wealth of possibilities for future discussion. On the Buddhist side, we
might compare Dögen's teaching on the non-duality of practice and attainment with Shinran's concerns about hakarai (calculation). How
might this intra-Buddhist discussion illuminate Christian questions regarding ascetics and mysticism?
As religions, Christianity and Buddhism are neither utterly different
nor fundamentally the same. Why, we must ask, do such extreme positions about their relationship have such wide currency? We need to
seek the middle ground which honors differences while noting similarities and which takes both seriously. Therefore, skill in making comparisons is important. The value of Mitchell's effort is that he has not been
content merely to catalogue differences, nor even to juxtapose similarity and difference. He has engaged in a form of Christian theology,
a normative quest for truth. Throughout the entire book lies the
138
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presumption that the truth is dangerous but redemptive. It is dangerous in that it requires us to change. It is redemptive in that it empowers us to change wisely. If this book only suggests ways to remain vulnerable to the truth, Donald Mitchell will have succeeded admirably.
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